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Internal (neuronal) representations in the brain are modified by our experiences, and this
phenomenon is not unique to sensory and motor systems. Here, we show that different
impressions obtained through social interaction with a variety of agents uniquely modu-
late activity of dorsal and ventral pathways of the brain network that mediates human
social behavior.
We scanned brain activity with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in 16
healthy volunteers when they performed a simple matching-pennies game with a human,
human-like android, mechanical robot, interactive robot, and a computer. Before playing
this game in the scanner, participants experienced social interactions with each opponent
separately and scored their initial impressions using two questionnaires.
We found that the participants perceived opponents in two mental dimensions: one
represented “mind-holderness” in which participants attributed anthropomorphic im-
pressions to some of the opponents that had mental functions, while the other dimension
represented “mind-readerness” in which participants characterized opponents as intelli-
gent. Interestingly, this “mind-readerness” dimension correlated to participants frequentlytion and Neural Networks (CiNet), National Institute of Information and Communication
ita, Osaka 565-0871, Japan.
Naito).
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was corroborated by increased entropy during the game. We also found that the two fac-
tors separately modulated activity in distinct social brain regions. Specifically, mind-
holderness modulated activity in the dorsal aspect of the temporoparietal junction (TPJ)
and medial prefrontal and posterior paracingulate cortices, while mind-readerness
modulated activity in the ventral aspect of TPJ and the temporal pole.
These results clearly demonstrate that activity in social brain networks is modulated
through pre-scanning experiences of social interaction with a variety of agents. Further-
more, our findings elucidated the existence of two distinct functional networks in the
social human brain. Social interaction with anthropomorphic or intelligent-looking agents
may distinctly shape the internal representation of our social brain, which may in turn
determine how we behave for various agents that we encounter in our society.
ª 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
It is well established that internal (neuronal) representations
in the brain can be modified by experience. Many previous
studies have elucidated how our sensory and motor experi-
ences shape representations in sensory-motor systems;
however, this phenomenon is not limited to the fundamental
systems since modifications can also be observed in brain
networks that mediate social behavior.
For example, when we play a game with others, we often
change our tactics depending on strategies used by our op-
ponents. In this way, our brain flexibly modifies our attitudes
and actions based on the perception and interpretation of our
opponent’s behavior (Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005; Frank,
Gilovich, & Regan, 1993; Kuzmanovic et al., 2012; Parise,
Kiesler, Sproull, & Waters, 1999).
The brain network thatmediates social interaction consists
of the posterior end of the superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), the
adjacent temporoparietal junction (TPJ), the temporal pole
(TP), the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and the posterior
paracingulate cortex (PCC) (Frith & Frith, 1999, 2003, 2006;
Olson, Plotzker, & Ezzyat, 2007; Saxe, 2006). Many previous
studies suggest that these brain regions are assigned specific
roles. For example, the mPFC and PCC are mainly activated
when an individual meditates his/her own mental state or
when they infer another individual’s mental state (Amodio &
Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 1999, 2003, 2006). On the other hand,
theTPseems tobe involved inmoreemotional aspectsof social
processing. Specifically, it has been proposed that this region
relates social perception with emotion since dysfunction of
this region leads to various psychiatric disorders related to
emotional regulation (Olson et al., 2007). Finally, the TPJ/pSTS
seems to cover a wide range of socio-cognitive functions, such
as social perception, perspective taking, and theory of mind.
Modulation of the activity in these social brain networks is
known to be dependent on various factors including interac-
tion between other humans and even robots (Chaminade
et al., 2012; Krach et al., 2008). Thus, it is likely that activity
in our social brain network is uniquely modulated by how we
perceive and interpret the structurally complex characteris-
tics of others (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007; Haslam, 2006;Loughnan & Haslam, 2007); however, this has yet to be fully
elucidated. To address this question, we prepared different
types of agents including human-like and non-human-like
robots since multiple agents likely give us different impres-
sions due to their specific characteristics. Indeed, neuro-
imaging research on our interactions with non-human agents
(android, robot, and artificial intelligence; Chaminade et al.,
2012; Krach et al., 2008) may help us to understand how our
brain forms an internal representation of social interactions.
In the present study, we designed a simple matching-
pennies game and performed functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) on 16 healthy volunteers while they played
against five different types of opponents: human, human-like
android, mechanical robot, interactive robot, and a computer.
As described, we included the robots in order to manipulate
the degree of human-like appearance and attitude, which
could elicit unique impressions to the participants who were
naı¨ve to robots. Before playing this game in the fMRI scanner,
participants had a chance to socially interact with each
opponent and scored their impressions about each interaction
using a questionnaire. We expected that participants would
have multi-dimensional perceptions about each opponent’s
characteristics since this has been indicated by previous
studies (Gray et al., 2007; Haslam, 2006; Loughnan & Haslam,
2007). We then tested our hypothesis that participants
change their behaviors (tactics) in subsequent gameplay
depending on their putative multi-dimensional perceptions
about each opponent obtained through the pre-scanning so-
cial interaction. In addition, we hypothesized that the partic-
ipants’ multi-dimensional perceptions would have a unique
impact on different sets of social brain networks during
gameplay (Fukui et al., 2006; Gallagher, Jack, Roepstorff, &
Frith, 2002; Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2004).2. Methods
2.1. Participants
In total, 20 healthy, right-handed volunteers participated in
this study. None of the participants had a history of neuro-
logical or psychiatric illness. All participants provided written
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approved by the Ethics Committee of Tamagawa University,
Japan. We analyzed the fMRI data obtained from 16 partici-
pants (five males; age range, 18e25 years), and excluded the
data obtained from the remaining four participants due to
excessive head motion (>5 mm) during the scan.
2.2. Tasks
2.2.1. General procedure
We scanned brain activity using fMRI while participants
played a matching-pennies game with each of the five oppo-
nents. The opponents included a human (woman in her
20 sec), a human-like android (Actroid F; Yoshikawa,
Matsumoto, Sumitani, & Ishiguro, 2011), a mechanical robot
(Infanoid; Kozima, 2002), an interactive robot (Keepon;
Kozima, Michalowski, & Nakagawa, 2008), and a computer
(Fig. 1a). As for the human opponent, we enrolled four women
in order to match the gender with female Actroid F, and in
order to avoid a particular opponent giving a specific
impression to the participants. Human opponents were ran-
domized participant by participant, but a given participant
always played the game against the same female opponent.
All participants were completely naı¨ve to Actroid F, Infanoid,
Keepon, and the particular human opponent. Before partici-
pants played the game in the fMRI scanner, each participant
experienced a short conversation with each opponent outside
the scanner (Fig. 1b) and was asked to answer two
questionnaires.
2.2.2. Short conversation outside the scanner
Each participant chatted with each opponent one-on-one for
30 sec prior to entering the scanner room. The order of the
opponents was randomized across participants. Conversa-
tions included the following three defined topics: first, the
participant verbally asked the name of the opponent, and then
briefly described their impression of their opponent, followed
by the participant talking about his/her ardor for the game
against the opponent. All opponents reacted with verbal re-
sponses and/or bodily gestures that were consistent across
participants (see Supplemental movies). When an opponent
was human, Actroid F, or Infanoid, it reacted to the first
question as follows: “My name is (name of the opponent). Nice
to meet you,” to the second question, “Thank you very much
for your kindly comment,” and to the third comment, “I will do
my best too.” Both the human and Actroid F opponents bowedFig. 1 e Five opponents (a) and a scene depicting a shto the participant (in physical Japanese-style greeting) before
and after the chatting session and did not move their bodies
except for this action. The Infanoid moved its head in order to
track the participant’s face and moved its hands arbitrarily
during chatting. The Keepon did not talk and simply reacted to
the participant’s speech bywiggling its body. In the case of the
computer that could not make bodily gestures, the participant
could only see the flow of complex program code in the
monitor, which we expected would give an impression of in-
telligence to the participant.
Supplementary data related to this article can be found
online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2014.03.011.
Immediately after the interaction with each opponent,
participants were asked to fill out questionnaires about each
opponent. The “impression questionnaire” required the
participant to rate the impressions of the opponent and was a
modified version of an original Japanese questionnaire
(Kanda, Ishiguro, Ono, Imai, & Nakatsu, 2002) that included 22
adjective items (human-like, intelligent, ethical, nice, cute,
friendly, active, positive, kind, warm, curious, thoughtful,
emotionally stable, rational, responsible, biological,
conscious, regular, natural, simple, emotional). Participants
were told to rate each opponent based on how well each ad-
jective item described the each opponent by choosing a
number from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating “an item does not fit to
the character of the opponent at all” and 7 indicating “an item
fits very well to the character of the opponent.”
The “mental function questionnaire” consisted of nine
sentences (#1e#9) as we listed in Supplemental material (e.g.,
“When I ignore the opponent, it will appeal to direct my
attention toward it.”). We asked participants to evaluate the
likelihood of performing the behavior described in each sen-
tencebychoosingyesorno.Whenaparticipant thought that an
opponent would likely perform the behavior described in a
sentence, they chose yes, otherwise they selected no. Through
the evaluation process using the second questionnaire, we
could infer to what degree the participants explicitly attributed
mental functions to each opponent, because not only a simple
reaction of an opponent but also fundamental aspects of op-
ponent’s mentality, such as thinking (#1), inference (#9),
emotion (#4 and #5) and motivation (#6), can be evaluated by
someof thepresent sentences. Participants tookapproximately
5 min to complete the two questionnaires for each opponent.
Using this design, all participants experienced social in-
teractionswith all opponents and evaluated their impressionsort-period conversation outside the scanner (b).
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were not preconceived notions that the participants had
formed before they met the opponents, since all of themwere
naı¨ve to each agent, and the impressions emerged purely from
perceptual dimension of the participants, which were not
corroborated by any particular substantial mental faculties of
the opponents.
2.2.3. Matching-pennies game
After participants completed the questionnaires for all oppo-
nents, they were asked to lie in the fMRI scanner with their
heads immobilized with an elastic band and sponge cushions
and their ears plugged. Visual stimuli were presented on a
projection screen and viewed by the participants via a mirror
mounted on the head coil. Inside the scanner, the participant
played a matching-pennies gamewhich is often cited in game
theory literature as themost simplified example of a zero-sum
competitive situation. The game was played between two
players: a participant and an opponent. In each trial, players
were requested to select either the left or the right side of their
bodies, with each participant making his/her decision by
pressing a button. A win or loss was determined based on the
combination of their decisions. Only when each participant
selected the same side as the opponent, he/she was awarded
with 100 yen (about 1 US$), otherwise he/she lost 100 yen.
Thus, being able to predict an opponent’s thoughts was very
important to win the game. The two leftward and rightward
arrows in the “Outcome” panel of Fig. 2 indicate selected di-
rections by the opponent (leftward) and by the participant
(rightward), respectively. In the example presented in Fig. 2,
the participant lost 100 yen.
Before participants entered the scanner room, they were
given instructions on how to play the game and were
encouraged to accumulate as many wins as possible. Impor-
tantly, participants were also instructed that they would play
the game against each opponent, which was presented as a
small icon at the top of the monitor inside the scanner. WeFig. 2 e Time course of gameplay in a block. The series of panel
played the matching-pennies game with an Infanoid. Througho
the top of the screen. At the very beginning of a block, an oppo
game started, participants were required to select either left or
middle finger within 1 sec. During this decision period, upward
decisions from the opponent and participant were shown as top
where the opponent chose its “right” and the participant chose h
This was repeated 20 times in each block. At the end of a block
participant received a reward of 200 yen. There was a 16-sec re
participants played with a new opponent.informed participants about the possibility that different op-
ponents may use different game tactics by providing them
with instructions stating that, “considering characteristic
differences among opponents may increase the reward that
you receive.” By giving this instruction, we expected that
participant’s attitude specific to each opponent could become
prominent. All participants completed five practice trials with
a computer opponent before entering the scanner room.
Once in the scanner, participants played against the same
pre-programmed computer algorithm for all five opponents
(human, Actroid F, Infanoid, Keepon, computer), which
generated each of two directions (left or right) with an equal
probability. Therefore, an expected wining ratio was fixed to
50% in each trial, regardless of the opponent. As confirmed by
interviewing participants after the experiment, the opponent
presented in the icon of each trial was believed to be the
opponent during that session.
Each trial lasted for 2 sec (Fig. 2), and participants were
required to select either the left or right side by pressing one of
two buttonswith their index ormiddle fingerwithin 1 sec. The
directions selected by the participant and by the opponent
were indicated by arrows, which were displayed in the
monitor so that the participant would know if he/she won or
lost in each trial. This was presented for 1 sec, and when
participants failed to respond within 1 sec, their response was
randomly determined for that trial.
Each block consisted of 20 trials that lasted for 1 min. In
each block, participants consistently played the gamewith the
same opponent. We prepared 15 blocks in a 15-min run. Each
participant played with the same, randomly selected oppo-
nent three times in each run. A breakwas taken between runs,
and the participants completed two runs in the scanner. Each
block began with the presentation of a 2-sec cue that directly
indicated the opponent with a word. Immediately after the
cue disappeared, participants started the game, which lasted
for 40 sec per block, i.e., 20 trials  2 sec. The total amount of
money earned in each block was displayed for 2 sec after thes represent a case of an Infanoid block, where a participant
ut a block, the opponent icon was consistently presented at
nent’s name was presented (2 sec). Immediately after the
right by pressing one of two buttons with their index or
and downward arrows were presented. Outcomes of
and bottom arrows, respectively. The panel shows the case
is/her “right”, meaning that the participant lost this game.
, the total reward was shown for 2 sec. In this case, the
sting period before the start of a next block where
Fig. 3 e Grand means of entropy for the five opponents
across participants. Error bars indicate standard errors of
means.
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of the block.
2.3. Data analysis
2.3.1. Behavioral analysis
We expected that participants would change their tactics
depending on the various impressions they had formed of the
different opponents they encountered during the game. One
stringent way to evaluate the changes in tactics was to
compute “entropy” (Ohira, Matsunaga, & Murakami, 2013;
Takahashi, Saito, Okada, & Omori, 2013), which can be a
measure of the degree of randomness or uncertainty in
decision-making.Moreover, it has been previously shown that
maximizing entropy is considered an optimal tactic in the
matching-pennies game, according to game theory (Camerer,
2003; Nash, 1950). Therefore, a greater entropy value reflects
difficulty in predicting a forthcoming participant’s response
based on the patterns of responses in previous trials. For
example, if players followed a simple rule, such as a win-stay/
lose-switch rule, the level of entropy tended to be low. In
contrast, entropy was at a maximum when participants’ be-
haviors were completely random during a trial.
We then quantified the randomness of decision-making for
each block of 20 trials as entropy, H, which was calculated
using the conditional frequency, p(djc), of the decision, d (L or
R), selected in the current game context, c (the recent choices
for participants and opponents). Entropy,H, indicated how the
decision, d, was generated independently of the current game
context, and the value of H positively correlated with the de-
gree of randomness of decision-making in the matching-
pennies game (Takahashi et al., 2013).
p(djc) was calculated from the following equation:
pðdjsÞ ¼ nðdjsÞ þ kP
ifnðijsÞ þ kg
where a variable n(djc) indicates the number of times a deci-
sion d was made in the context of c, and k is a correction co-
efficient that prevents small samples from deforming p(djc).
Due to the limitation of workingmemory capacity in humans,
it is unlikely that participants were able to access the entire
context in the game. Thus, we assumed that their decisions
were made based on a portion of the context and assumed six
partial contexts (pc) for entropy estimation (i.e., S1, the latest
decision by the participant; S2, the last two decisions by the
participant; O1, the latest decision by the opponent; O2, the
last two decisions by the opponent; S1 & O1, a combination of
the latest decisions both by the participant and by the oppo-
nent; none, no game context). Below, cpc indicates the game
context corresponding to each pc and entropy, H(djcpc), in
each block was calculated using the following equation:
Hpc ¼  1Npc
X
cpc
X
d
p

djcpc

log2p

djcpc

Here, Npc is the number of possible alternatives for a
particular cpc and this variable normalizes Hpc in a range from
0 to 1. For each block, the lowest value among the six entropy
values was chosen as the decision-entropy value for that
block. Importantly, this value could potentially increase
toward a value of one as decisions became less predictable.We next calculated mean entropy for each opponent and
each participant separately, and then calculated the grand
mean across participants (Fig. 3). We performed a one-way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) for entropy and post-hoc t-
tests to evaluate the statistical difference in entropy between
opponents.
2.3.2. Questionnaire analysis
We performed principle component analysis (PCA) for the
results obtained from the impression questionnaire by pool-
ing the data obtained from all participants. The factor struc-
ture of 21 items (see above) was assessed by PCA (Lisetti,
Brown, Alvarez, & Marpaung, 2004) using the MATLAB statis-
tical toolbox (The MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA). We found
three representative orthogonal axes (from the first to third
components, see Table 1). Each opponent had a specific value
for each PCA component, and these were further used as
parametric covariates in our subsequent fMRI analysis.
In order to analyze data obtained from themental function
questionnaire, we simply counted the number of “yes” an-
swers collected from participants for all nine sentences
assigned to describe each opponent. This value was deter-
mined as a mental function score, which may represent how
much the participants explicitly attributed mental functions
to each opponent. Next, we calculated the correlation coeffi-
cient between the values of the PCA component obtained from
the two questionnaires across the five opponents. This was
done separately for each PCA component. Similarly, we also
calculated correlation coefficients between the PCA and en-
tropy values for each participant. We then transformed the
acquired correlation coefficients to z-scores within each
participant. One-sample t-tests were then performed to eval-
uate if the correlation coefficients obtained from all partici-
pants were significantly different from 0. By evaluating the
correlations, we were able to determine which PCA compo-
nent better reflected themental function score (howmuch the
participants explicitly attributed mental functions to
Table 1 e Loads of questionaries’ items for each PCA
component.
1st 2nd 3rd
Human-like .3345 .0081 .3498
Intelligent .0745 .4607 .2512
Ethical .0398 .4523 .1508
Nice .1751 .0867 .0029
Cute .2846 .0619 .281
Friendly .3243 .0007 .3127
Active .2078 .166 .3477
Positive .1671 .1705 .3017
Kind .19 .042 .0562
Warm .2748 .0066 .1688
Curious .1749 .0718 .2756
Thoughtful .164 .127 .0819
Emotionally stable .0231 .348 .0972
Rational .0748 .4174 .0638
Responsible .108 .026 .2067
Biological .3322 .1024 .412
Conscious .329 .1184 .1665
Regular .1018 .0284 .0017
Natural .2841 .0633 .0812
Simple .1265 .4033 .1303
Emotional .2838 .0642 .1071
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changed their choices during the game).2.4. fMRI scan
2.4.1. fMRI data acquisition
Functional imaging was conducted using a 3-T Siemens Trio A
Tim MRI scanner. For functional imaging during the experi-
mental sessions, interleaved T2*-weighted gradient-echo
echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequences were used to acquire 44
continuous 3-mm-thick, trans-axial slices that covered nearly
the entire cerebellum [repetition time (TR) ¼ 3000 msec,
echo time (TE) ¼ 25 msec, flip angle (FA) ¼ 90, field of
view (FOV) ¼ 192 mm2, 64  64 matrix, voxel
dimensions ¼ 3.0  3.0  3.0 mm]. A high-resolution anatom-
ical T1-weighted imagewas also acquired for each participant.
We collected 298 functional volumes in each 15-min run.
2.4.2. fMRI data pre-processing
In this analysis, we discarded the first four volumes to allow for
magnetization equilibration. Data were then analyzed using
Statistical Parametric Mapping 8 (SPM8, Wellcome Department
of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK) software implemented in
Matlab 2013a (The MathWorks, Inc.). After correcting for differ-
ences in slice timing within each image volume, head motion
was corrected using the realignment program within SPM8.
Following realignment, volumes were normalized to the Mon-
treal Neurological Institute (MNI) space using a transformation
matrix, which was obtained from the normalization process of
thefirstEPI imageofeachparticipant to theEPI template.Finally,
normalized fMRIdatawere spatially smoothedwith an isotropic
Gaussian kernel of 8 mm (full-width at half-maximum).
2.4.3. fMRI data analysis
We used a general linear model (GLM) to analyze the fMRI
data. From the above-mentioned questionnaire data andbehavioral analyses, it was determined that participants most
likely changed their game tactics based on the different im-
pressions of their various opponents. Thus, we expected that
these impressions formed before scanning would modulate
brain activity during the game. We then prepared parametric
regressors to depict such brain regions.
We prepared four regressors per participant: one regressor
was game-related used to specify the game period composed
of 20 consecutive trials in each block by excluding the last 16-
sec resting period (see above), while the other three regressors,
which were constructed based on the three PCA components
obtained from the impression questionnaire analysis, were
used for parametric modulation. Participants played with each
opponent block by block and had specific values for each PCA
component. Thus, we generated a parametric regressor by
modulating the amplitude of the game-related regressor with
the PCA value assigned to that opponent by the participant.
This was done for all three PCA components.
The parametric modulation analysis for each PCA compo-
nent was first performed in each participant separately. The
result of this analysis was the estimated blood oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) signal change obtained from each of the
16 participants. To accommodate inter-participant variability,
the images from all participants were entered into a random
effects group analysis (second-level analysis; Friston, Holmes,
& Worsley, 1999) using one-sample t-tests (15 degrees of
freedom), and a voxel-wise threshold of p < .001 (uncorrected)
was used to generate a cluster image. The significance of the
cluster size was determined at p < .05 with the family-wise
error rate (FWE) correction in the entire brain space.3. Results
3.1. Impression of each opponent: results from PCA
The PCA analysis for the impression questionnaire revealed
three representative orthogonal axes (from first to third
components). The contribution rates of the first to third
components were 74.4%, 13.2%, and 12.4%, respectively. The
loads of questionnaire points for each component are listed in
Table 1.
As shown in Table 1, the first component positively corre-
lated with scores for human-like, cute, friendly, warm, bio-
logical, conscious, natural, and emotional (correlation
coefficients >.25). The second component positively corre-
lated with intelligent, ethical, emotionally stable, and rational
(correlation coefficients >.25), and negatively correlated with
simple (correlation coefficients <.25). Finally, the third
component positively correlated with human-like, intelligent,
and biological (correlation coefficients >.25), but negatively
correlated with cute, friendly, active, positive, and curious
(correlation coefficients <.25). These results strongly indi-
cate that participants formed different impressions of each
opponent during the pre-scanning interaction session.
3.2. Mental function score
When we calculated mental function scores based on the re-
sults of the questionnaire, the mental function score
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F, and human, indicating that participants tended to attribute
mental functions to non-human opponents in this order.3.3. Entropy
Fig. 3 shows the grandmeans of entropy for the five opponents
across participants. A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect of opponents [F(4,15) ¼ 6.40, p < .001], and post-
hoc t-tests revealed that entropies for human, Actroid F, and
the computerwere significantly higher than those for Infanoid
and Keepon (Ryan’s method, p < .05). This means that
randomness in the series of left or right choices increased
when the opponent was human, Actroid F, or a computer.3.4. Relationship between PCA components and other
behavioral measurements
When we evaluated correlations between PCA components
and mental function scores and between PCA components
and entropy, we found that the first PCA component (Table 1)
was significantly correlated with the mental function score
(p < .05, one-sample t-test across participants) but not with
the entropy (p < .05, one-sample t-test across participants)
(Fig. 4). In contrast, the third PCA component was significantly
correlated with entropy (p < .05, one-sample t-test across
participants) but not with mental function (p < .05, one-
sample t-test across participants). No significant correlations
were observed between the second PCA component and both
behavioral variables. Thus, the first PCA component corre-
sponded well to howmuch the participants attributed mental
functions to the various opponents, but did not reflect that
participants’ mental factors influenced changing their game
tactics. In contrast, the third PCA component well described
participant’s mental factors but not the attribution of mental
function. Importantly, these two PCA components also had
large loads of human-like in the impression questionnaire
(Table 1).Fig. 4 e Relationships between PCA components and
mental function score (left) and between PCA components
and entropy (right). The correlation coefficients were
transformed to z-scores. The first PCA component was
significantly correlated with the mental function score,
whereas the third PCA component was significantly
correlated with entropy.Based on these findings, we plotted specific values for each
opponent obtained from the first and third PCA components
in the x- and y-axes, respectively (Fig. 5). We found that the
values increased in the order of computer, Infanoid, Keepon,
Actroid F, and human along the x-axis, whereas the values
became greater in the order of Keepon, Infanoid, computer,
Actroid F, and human along the y-axis.
As we found that the first PCA component reflected the
participants’ attributions of mental function to the opponents
and that the third PCA component corresponded to the par-
ticipants’ mental factors that led to changing game tactics in
order to prevent their tactics being envisioned by their oppo-
nents (Fig. 4), we defined the x-axis as representing “mind-
holderness” and the y-axis as representing “mind-readerness”
of the opponents (Fig. 5). In light of this view, we could better
explain that the Keepon was perceived by the participants as
an agent with relatively high mind-holderness but less mind-
readerness, in contrast an intelligent-looking computer was
perceived as an agent with relatively high mind-readerness
but less mind-holderness. Human opponents were classified
as agents with higher mind-readerness andmind-holderness,
and Actroid F (human-like android) was classified similarly.
These results clearly indicate the multi-dimensionality in the
perception of the various agents, which generally fits with a
previous report (Gray et al., 2007).
3.5. Modulation of brain activity by preformed
impression of an opponent
When we performed parametric modulation analysis, we
found that activities in the bilateral mPFCs, posterior PCCs,
TPJ/pSTS, and the left hippocampuswere positively correlated
with the regressor generated from the first PCA component
(red areas in Fig. 6a and b). This suggests that the perceived
mind-holderness of the opponents significantly modulatedFig. 5 e Location of each opponent in two-dimensional
space. The x-axis indicates “mind-holderness” and the y-
axis indicates “mind-readerness” (see text). The score of
PCA components for each opponent represents the mean
value among participants.
Fig. 6 e fMRI results. Brain regions where activities were modulated by “mind-holderness” (red) and “mind-readerness”
(blue) are shown in panels (a) and (b). In panel (a), regions are superimposed on a lateral view of the MNI standard brain. In
panel (b), regions are superimposed on a sagittal section, x[D 1. In panels (c) and (d), regions activated during the game are
shown in the corresponding images. The purple section in panel (c) represents a TPJ section where activity was modulated
both by “mind-holderness” and by “mind-readerness”, which also corresponded to the region activated during game
playing.
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in the right TPJ/STS and TP were positively correlated with the
regressor obtained from the third PCA component (blue areas
in Fig. 6a). This indicates that the mind-readerness of the
opponents significantly modulated the activities in these re-
gions. The locations of voxels showing the strongest correla-
tion with the regressors in each region are listed in Tables 2
and 3.
Importantly, activity in the same area of the right TPJ/pSTS
was correlated both with first and third component re-
gressors, but there was a tendency that the more posterior-
dorsal aspect of this region was modulated by mind-
holderness, whereas the anterior-ventral aspect wasTable 2e Regionswhere activities aremodulated bymind-
holderness.
Location MNI
coordinate
Z value Cluster
size (voxels)
x y z
mPFC 6 60 20 4.27 1793
Right TPJ/pSTS 46 56 20 4.22 470
Left hippocampus 14 30 4 3.95 273
Left TPJ/pSTS 40 58 24 3.87 291
Precuneus/PCC 8 52 36 3.79 416modulated by mind-readerness. Taken together, two inde-
pendent impressions of mind-holderness and mind-
readerness obtained from the opponents through pre-
scanning social interaction modulated the activity in distinct
brain regions while participants played the game.
No areas that showed negative correlations with these two
components were depicted. Likewise, no significant modula-
tion of brain activity was observed in association with the
second PCA component.
Finally, whenwe examined game-related brain regions, we
found that several cortical and subcortical regions were acti-
vated during game playing (green areas in Fig. 6c and d).
However, except for a small section in the TPJ (purple area in
Fig. 6a), the above-mentioned regions did not exhibit signifi-
cant activity increases during gameplay.Table 3e Regionswhere activities aremodulated bymind-
readerness.
Location MNI coordinate Z value Cluster
size (voxels)x y z
Right TPJ/pSTS 58 46 0 4.63 293
Right TP 36 20 32 4.33 638
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4.1. Impression affected later game tactics
In the present study, participants consistently played the
game with a fixed computer algorithm pre-prepared by an
experimenter. However, participants were instructed that
they would play the game with each opponent, which would
be indicated as a small icon at the top of themonitor inside the
scanner. Indeed, post-scanning we confirmed that all of the
participants believed that they played with five distinct op-
ponents. Thus, changes in game tactics corresponding to each
opponent largely depended on impressions that were formed
during the previous interactive experiences (chatting).
This claim is supported by the following lines of evidence.
First, the icon was too small for the participants to obtain
online information about subtle changes in the opponents’
facial expressions and behaviors. Thus, participants had to
rely on their initial impressions about each opponent. Second,
the entropy values obtained when the participants played
with the computer were comparable with those obtained
when playing against a human (Fig. 3). Interestingly, in a
previous study where people played with a computer that did
not show a lively flow of complex program code, the former
was smaller than the latter (Takahashi et al., 2013). This in-
dicates that impressions formed in the current study were
obtained through pre-scanning interactions, and not from
general preconceived notions. Finally, we found that hippo-
campal activity was modulated by mind-holderness (Table 2).
It has been shown that people use their own repertoire of
memories to predict the mental states of others, especially
when the agents are similar to themselves (Perry, Hendler, &
Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Thus, the present hippocampal activ-
ity modulated by mind-holderness likely reflects a similar
mental process where participants accessed their memories
about the impressions they had made of each opponent.
Taken together, the previously obtained impression about
opponents gained through direct interaction before the
scanning likely affected game tactics that the participants
employed in the scanner.4.2. Mind-holderness and mind-readerness
In the present study, both mind-holderness and mind-
readerness are defined in perceptual dimension. These are
impressions of opponents received by the participants. In this
sense, the present definition of mind-holderness and mind-
readerness was not based on any particular substantial
mental faculties of the opponents, which were not evaluated
in the present study.
We found that the first PCA component reflected the de-
gree to which participants attributed mental function to the
opponents (Fig. 4), and that PCA values increased in the order
of computer, Infanoid, Keepon, Actroid F, and human (Fig. 5).
Thus, the horizontal mental axis in Fig. 5 reflects the oppo-
nent’s degree of anthropomorphism, i.e., how much the par-
ticipants thought that each opponent had mental function.
Hence, the different degrees of perceived mind-holderness of
the opponent likely affected the participant’s mentaloperations while they played the game, as indicated by its
specificmodulation of brain activity in a particular set of brain
regions (see Fig. 6 and below).
The verticalmental axis in Fig. 5 (the third PCA component)
should reflect different aspects of the opponent’s character-
istics, as this component was not correlated with the mental
function score but correlated with behavioral entropy (Fig. 4).
Greater entropy was observed when participants played with
the computer, Actroid F, and human as compared with the
Keepon and Infanoid (Fig. 2). It is theoretically known that,
when people play this type of game, they tend to increase
entropy in order to prevent their tactics from being read by an
opponent (Nash, 1950). Based on this notion, together with our
present entropy finding (Fig. 4), mind-readerness seems to be
suitable to represent this metal axis. As described above, the
present mind-readerness does not require any substantial
ability of “mind reading” of an opponent, but reflect partici-
pants’ impression that an opponent likely envisions their
game tactics. In light of this view, it is worth discussing an
opponent’s possible gaze. We know from our previous study
that when people play this game with a humanoid robot,
behavioral entropy significantly increases in those who are
sensitive to a robot’s gaze compared to those who are not
(Takahashi et al., 2013). This generally indicates that sensi-
tivity to an opponent’s gaze may increase behavioral entropy
during the game, and the underlying mental states of partic-
ipants are most likely strategizing to prevent their game tac-
tics from being envisioned by the opponent. Thus, the present
increase in participant entropy during gameplay with an
intelligent-looking opponent with greater mind-readerness
(computer, Actroid F, and human) indicates the existence of
this type of cautious mental state.
One caveat to our conclusion is that there could bemultiple
alternative labels of the two mental axes (e.g., cool/warm,
intelligence/emotion). An interesting avenue for future study
is to refine the interpretations. On the other hand, it is worth
noting that in the present study we demonstrated the multi-
dimensionality of human social perceptions about other
people/robots/agents and uncovered the underlying neural
mechanisms.
4.3. Roles of two distinct sets of brain regions
4.3.1. Resemblance of social brain network and default mode
network (DMN)
In the present study, we identified two distinct sets of brain
regions with activities that were differently modulated
depending on the perceived degrees of mind-holderness and
mind-readerness of the opponents (Fig. 6). However, except
for a small section in the TPJ (purple area in Fig. 6c), these sets
of brain regions did not correspond to those with significantly
increased activity during gameplay.
Among the modulated brain regions, the mPFC, PCC, and
parts of the TPJ seem to correspond to brain regions that form
the DMN, which shows increased activity during passive or
resting periods compared to task periods (Raichle et al., 2001;
Shulman et al., 1997). Thus, our findings are consistent with
the accumulating evidence that the human social brain
network closely resembles the DMN (Mars, Neubert, et al.,
2012). Activities of these brain regions likely reflect ongoing
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the participant’s bodily, perceptual, mental, and emotional
states, which people call “random episodic silent thinking”
(Andreasen et al., 1995) and “mind wandering” (Mason et al.,
2007). Thus, these brain regions are essentially destined to
deactivate during a “task” that requires participants to focus
on achieving a specific purpose as explicitly constrained by an
experimenter. In this vein, gameplay in the current study was
our “task” that activated a wide range of cortical and subcor-
tical brain regions (Fig. 6). On the other hand, unconstrained
implicit thoughts that pertained to this task, e.g., active
reading of the opponent’s mental state and tactics to win a
game, likely modulated the activity in the sets of brain
regions.
Hereinafter, we argue two distinct roles of these sets of
brain regions, which were uniquely modulated by the
perception of the mind-holderness and mind-readerness
attributed to opponents.
4.3.2. Mind-holderness
In the current study, we found that mind-holderness modu-
lated activities in the posterior-dorsal section of the TPJ and in
the networks of the PCC and mPFC (Fig. 6) that belong to the
cingulum fiber tract (Thiebaut de Schotten, Dell’Acqua,
Valabregue, & Catani, 2012). Humans possess the ability to
make inferences about other people’s mental states, such as
the intentions and desires of others, and to refer to them to
predict and explain behavior. This behavior, called mentaliz-
ing, is known to engage the social brain network (see
Introduction), especially brain regions that belong to the
cingulum tract (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 1999, 2003,
2006). The fact that the present brain regions directly corre-
sponded to this mentalizing network indicates that the par-
ticipants tried to mentalize an opponent’s intention, tactics,
and emotion during the game. Importantly, as the actual
opponent was always the same computer algorithm that
consistently used a fixed tactic irrespective of the opponent
shown in the icon, this mentalizing was conducted by the
participants based upon their formed pre-scanning social
impressions of their opponents. Our claim that mentalizing
occurs even for the present non-human opponents is
corroborated by the finding that when people play a game
with non-human agents, activities in thementalizing network
(mPFC and TPJ/STS) change according to the human-likeness
of an agent (Krach et al., 2008). Taken together, the present
activity modulation observed in this set of brain regions likely
reflects the participants’ mentalizing processes employed to
read opponents’ mental states, even for the non-human
agents, depending on the degrees of opponents’ mind-
holderness.
4.3.3. Mind-readerness
In contrast, mind-readerness modulated activities in the
anterior-ventral section of the TPJ including the pSTS and in
the TP that belongs to the uncinate fascicule (UF) fiber tract
(Thiebaut de Schotten et al., 2012). The UF tract is the largest
tract of the fronto-temporal connections and is a ventral
limbic pathway that originates rostrally in the temporal lobe
and terminates in the ventral, medial, and orbital parts of the
frontal cortex. This tract connects cortical regions involved invisual and auditory recognition (superior and inferior tem-
poral gyri) and in recognition memory (entorhinal, perirhinal,
and parahippocampal cortices) with frontal areas implicated
in emotion, inhibition, and self-regulation (Price et al., 2008;
Schmahmann et al., 2007). Thus, the UF tract plays an
important role in the interaction between cognition and
emotion (Barbas, 2000; MacLean, 1952). In particular, the TP in
the UF tract seems to be key in linking these two systems
(Olson et al., 2007), which is necessary for complex informa-
tion processing required for social interaction. Indeed, lesions
involving the human UF tract may result in antisocial be-
haviors, probably due to the loss of self-regulation (Price et al.,
2008). As described above, participants increased the
randomness in their left or right choices (indicating entropy)
depending on their perceived mind-readerness of opponents.
Additionally, their underlying mental states were likely being
employed for preventing their game tactics from being envi-
sioned by intelligent-looking opponents. Considering the TP’s
function in linking cognition and emotion, the present activity
modulation in the TP might be reflective of the participant’s
cautious mental states, which could have also affected their
emotional states during the game.
4.3.4. The distinct functions of posterior-dorsal and anterior-
ventral TPJ
We should also carefully discuss the finding that activities in
different TPJ portions were uniquely modulated by mind-
holderness and mind-readerness. Recently, it was shown
that the TPJ can be subdivided into posterior-dorsal and
anterior-ventral portions on the basis of its structural and
functional connectivity (Mars, Neubert, et al., 2012; Mars,
Sallet, et al., 2012). This finding indicates that these two TPJ
areas play distinct roles, as has been previously suggested
(Saxe, 2006).
The peak coordinate of the present TPJ region where ac-
tivity was modulated by mind-holderness (Table 2) well-
corresponded to those reported in many previous mentaliz-
ing tasks (Gallagher et al., 2000; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Van
Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). For example, one recent study
has revealed that a person who has a strong tendency to
attribute anthropomorphism (human characteristics) to ani-
mals or nonliving stimuli has greater gray matter volume in
the TPJ (Cullen, Kanai, Bahrami, & Rees, 2013). Thus, the pre-
sent activity modulation in the posterior-dorsal portion of the
TPJ likely reflects different degrees of mentalizing that
depended on how much participants anthropomorphized
their opponents. Moreover, we assume that the role of the TPJ
activity observed in this study was due to participants
considering other’s perspectives in order to interpret their
opponents’ internal states such as intention, emotion, and
preference. This claim also seems to be supported by many
previous findings (Blanke & Arzy, 2005; Decety, 2005; Jackson,
Brunet, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2006; Ruby & Decety, 2004; Seger,
Stone, & Keenan, 2004).
In contrast, the major role of the anterior-ventral TPJ/pSTS
is social processing of an individual’s physical signs especially
as elicited from the face and eyes (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy,
2000; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Puce, Allison, Bentin, Gore, &
McCarthy, 1998; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009; Wicker,
Michel, Henaff, & Decety, 1998). Based on our previous
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ioral entropy during gameplay (Takahashi et al., 2013), we
speculate that detecting possible gaze from opponents could
be an important factor in modulating activity in this brain re-
gion. As the computer opponent does not have eyes, we as-
sume that this region is also capable of detectingpotential gaze
not only from physical eyes, but also from the mind’s eye.
4.4. Conclusion
Taken all together, when the opponent was an anthropo-
morphic mind-holder, participants took opponents’ perspec-
tives into account in order to mentalize their intention,
tactics, and even emotion by recruiting the dorso-medial
cingulum network. On the other hand, when the opponent
was categorized as a mind-reader, participants became
mindful of the possible gaze of the opponent, which could be
reflected as modulation of activity in the anterior-ventral TPJ/
pSTS. These results suggest that social interaction with mind-
holder or mind-reader may distinctly shape the internal rep-
resentation of our social brain, which may in turn determine
how we behave for various agents that we encounter in our
society.
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